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ABSTRACT
A growing body of literature examines whether corporate clients derive sufficient value
from the law firms that they engage. Yet little attention has been paid to whether clients
optimally select among law firms in the first place. One entry-point is to identify
discrepancies in the quality of counsel selected by different corporate clients for the very same
work. Using a large sample of loans, this Article finds that major U.S. public companies
select lower-ranked law firms for their financing transactions than do private equity-owned
companies, controlling for various deal characteristics. While some of this discrepancy can be
attributed to value-maximizing behavior, agency and other information problems within
public companies may distort their choice of counsel. Contrary to the thrust of existing
commentary, U.S. public companies may well be spending too little on outside counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate clients select their law firms for myriad reasons, some of which
are likely to be value-maximizing, and some of which are not. The economic
stakes are high: to the extent that clients fail to make first-best decisions in
hiring counsel, they may derive needlessly poor outcomes from the legal
services that they purchase, while law firms earn large rents at their clients’
expense. Yet because we lack straightforward measures of the quality of law
firms’ output, we are generally left either to assume that clients choose their
counsel rationally or to suspect that they do not, depending solely on our
priors about the efficiency of markets.
This Article takes an indirect tack in broaching the problem. It begins with
a more readily observable inquiry—whether different types of corporate clients
select different quality counsel for the very same work. If so, we have
evidence that, at the very least, law-firm selection is non-random. Further, we
will be left with a far simpler task than assessing the efficiency of law firm
selection in general. The set of plausible factors driving a discrepancy in
choice of counsel between different types of clients is likely to be
comparatively small. Once identified, these factors can be classified according
to whether they are likely to be value-maximizing for the client, providing
narrower testable hypotheses for future work.
This Article focuses on two types of clients having very different goals and
governance, but with the financial means to select among a wide range of law
firms: 1) large private equity firms and 2) major public companies.1 Given
their prominence in large financings and acquisitions, private equity firms have
increasingly captured the time and attention of elite law firms in the United
States and abroad. Private equity firms tend to be leanly staffed2 and thus to
rely heavily on outside counsel. Large public companies, by contrast, may
have large teams of in-house lawyers and are therefore less reliant on outside
counsel for certain types of work.3 These and other differences between the
1 “Private equity” as used herein refers only to investment funds whose focus is leveraged,
majority-stake investments in mature businesses—that is, leveraged buyout funds. Thus, for
example, venture capital is not treated here as private equity.
2 See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989,
at 70.
3 See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
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two may manifest in different preferences for the quality of outside counsel
that they select.
Various theories have been advanced for the value added by lawyers in
corporate transactions. Gilson (1984) describes transactional lawyers as
“transaction-cost engineers” who, even in the absence of regulation, can increase
the transaction value by structuring the transaction and crafting contract terms
so as to minimize the parties’ aggregate transaction costs (including in
particular their information costs).4 Kraakman and others suggest that law
firms act as reputational intermediaries in corporate transactions: their reputation
plays a certification role that allows parties to reach an agreement at lower
cost.5 Still others argue that transactional lawyers primarily serve as regulatory
experts.6 When the focus narrows to law firms with high-market-share
transactional practices, their knowledge of the current “market” terms for a
particular type of transaction can also create value.7 As market information
experts, they should be able to negotiate transaction terms that yield more
transaction surplus for their clients.8
Using a large sample of syndicated loan transactions, I find that private
equity-owned companies are substantially more likely to engage top-ranked
borrower’s counsel than are their public-company counterparts, controlling for
various loan characteristics. Why might private equity sponsors be more
willing to pay for elite law firms than much larger organizations such as
Fortune 500 companies, for the very same types of transactions? Conversely,
what explains the relative reticence of major corporations to engage top-tier
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277–80 (1985) (describing the increasing importance of in-house counsel in
large corporations).
4 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
5 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 61 n.20 (1986); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74
OR. L. REV. 15, 18–19 (1995); Gilson, supra note 4, at 290–93; Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules,
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1739–40 (1998). For empirical work
testing the gatekeeper hypothesis, see Royce de R. Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel as
Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 164, 165 (2007) (finding that higher-quality law firms preserve some independence
relative to the issuer in IPOs); Michael Bradley et al., Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt
Market?, 38 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 150, 162 (2014) (finding no evidence in the sovereign debt
markets that law firms act as reputational intermediaries).
6 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 239 (2010); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 500
(2007).
7 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 41 J.
Corp. L. 101 (forthcoming 2016). See also Christel Karsten, Ulrike Malmendier & Zacharias
Sautner, M&A Negotiations and Lawyer Expertise (Mar. 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576866 (finding that more experienced M&A lawyers obtain
better contract terms for their clients).
8 Id.
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law firms?
In considering these questions, we first observe that private equity firms
are relatively well incentivized to select counsel for their portfolio companies
that maximizes their expected value from the transaction. Private equity
investments are typically highly leveraged,9 meaning that any improvement in
transaction terms that counsel can obtain results in a relatively larger economic
return. Further, private equity sponsors benefit more directly from such
increased returns than do the public-company agents—typically, general
counsels—responsible for selecting outside counsel. Private equity sponsors
commonly receive twenty percent of the profits from their portfolio-company
transactions (the “carry”),10 which is then shared among a relatively small
number of individuals. Such high-powered incentives to maximize transaction
value contrast with the relatively low-powered incentives faced by publiccompany general counsels.11
Not only are private equity firms better incentivized to select counsel
optimally, they are arguably better able to do so. As sophisticated, repeat
players with respect to leveraged acquisitions,12 they can benchmark their
outside counsel’s performance across a sizable volume of transactions. Thus,
overall, private equity firms internalize both the costs (higher legal fees) and
the benefits (the expectation of a better economic deal) of hiring top-tier law
firms relatively well. From the outset, then, their revealed preference for elite
counsel suggests that it is likely to be value-maximizing.
The picture for public companies is murkier. Major public companies face
a classic “make-or-buy” decision when it comes to transactional work: they can
engage a law firm or rely on in-house counsel.13 Yet framing the make-or-buy
decision as a binary choice is misleading in this context. In practice, the
difficulty lies in selecting from a wide range in quality of outside counsel, once
the decision to “buy” has been made. This Article’s empirical result raises the
possibility that public companies are selecting an inefficiently low quality of
legal work for their transactions. Stated differently, a general counsel’s bias
toward “making” legal work in-house may manifest as a tendency not only to
forgo (or under-utilize) outside counsel for certain work, but also to select
lower-quality outside counsel than is optimal for the company.
9 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 121, 124 (2009).
10 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
11 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRM,
MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (describing the high-powered incentives
provided by market transactions versus the low-powered incentives within firms).
12 See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 115 (2013).
13 See Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J.
CORP. L. 497 (2008).
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To be sure, in-house counsel at public companies can help monitor outside
law firms’ work,14 thus potentially increasing the value that outside counsel
provides once a law firm has been engaged. Yet there are reasons to doubt whether
public-company general counsels optimally select among law firms in the first
instance. Particularly for one-off transactions, general counsels may not be
correctly incentivized to make value-maximizing choices. Information, agency,
and influence costs within public companies may drive general counsels to
steer transactional work to cheaper firms or to in-house counsel, even when
doing so is not in shareholders’ best interests.15 This raises the surprising
possibility that, contrary to the prevailing view, major U.S. public companies
may in fact be under-spending on legal services.16
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the data and regression
model and presents the finding of a substantial discrepancy in the quality of
counsel selected by private equity-owned companies and public companies.
Part II discusses plausible explanations for the differential. Finally, Part III
assesses these explanations in practice, through a case study of four multibillion-dollar loan transactions for which the public-company borrowers chose
law firms outside the circle of elite borrower’s counsel.
I. LAW FIRM SELECTION IN PRACTICE: PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS VS.
PUBLIC COMPANIES
This Part provides evidence that private equity sponsors are more likely to
engage top-tier law firms to negotiate their syndicated-loan financings (or
“bank debt”)17 than are public companies.
See, e.g., Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 487 (1989)
15 See infra Part II.B.C.
16 Contra Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the
Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (identifying excessive fees as one of
the threats to the future of major corporate law firms).
17 Syndicated loans are typically senior secured commercial loans that are arranged by a
major investment or commercial bank and funded by a large group of bank and non-bank
lenders. See Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan
Markets, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 21, 23–24 (Allison
Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking:
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 982
(2009). Relative to other major corporate transactions, syndicated loans are lightly regulated in
the United States and otherwise raise little risk of litigation. Most notably, syndicated loans are
not treated as securities, notwithstanding that they may be held and traded by large numbers of
investors. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan
Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 747 (2014); Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, Managing Regulatory Blindspots,
32 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (2015). To be sure, a syndicated loan transaction may involve litigation
risk if it occurs in connection with another high-stakes transaction, such as an acquisition.
14
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A. Description of Data
The initial sample consists of 4,201 credit agreements for U.S. syndicated
loans issued between July 2011 and May 2016, from the Practical Law
database.18 This database is limited to credit agreements that were publicly
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Relative to the
complete universe of syndicated loans, therefore, larger loans are likely
overrepresented in our sample, while loans involving private companies
(including, notably, loans to private-equity-owned companies) are
underrepresented.19 After excluding loans totaling less than $50 million in
principal amount and loans used for debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, we
are left with a sample of 4,164 credit agreements.
For each loan, the primary characteristics of interest are 1) whether the
borrower was sponsored by a private-equity firm and 2) the quality of the
borrower’s law firm (if any). Because law-firm quality is not directly
observable, two categories of metrics are constructed here as proxies: rankings
based on market share (designed to capture law firms’ experience with the
applicable type of transaction) and rankings based on reputation among
market participants. In the first category, we derive each law firm’s share of
borrower-side legal representation for syndicated loan deals (or leveraged
syndicated loan deals, depending on the regression sample used), where market
share is based here on aggregate dollar-amount of loans. The loan amounts
for each law firm are obtained from Bloomberg and independently calculated
within our sample of Practical Law credit agreements, creating two separate
market-share metrics.20
Unlike what we observe with law-firm league tables for mergers and
acquisitions, the set of top borrower-side law firms by market share for
syndicated loans (and leveraged syndicated loans) is somewhat variable from
year to year. Given that, we instead rank firms in each year based on a
calculation of their aggregate market share of borrower-side representation
What’s Market—Credit Agreements: Comprehensive Deal Database, PRAC. L.,
http://us.practicallaw.com/resources/us-whats-market.
19 This sample bias should not be problematic for our analysis, however. First, we
explicitly restrict the sample to large loans (greater than $50 million in principal amount) in any
event, in order to ensure that all borrowers in the sample have the ability to pay for a wide
range in quality of counsel. Second, relying solely on publicly-filed credit agreements implies
that, to the extent the borrower is private-equity-sponsored, that private equity firm is likely to
be larger than average. (For example, many such credit agreements likely involve going-private
transactions.) The empirical tests control for loan size, however, which should achieve some
measure of normalization between the private equity firms and the public companies in the
sample.
20 The Bloomberg data is based on self-reporting by law firms, and covers all syndicated
loans (or leveraged syndicated loans), rather than just loans publicly filed with the SEC.
18
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over the previous several years.21 Finally, a firm is coded as top-ranked in a
given year if it fell within the top 10, 15, or 20 law firms for that year.
Our reputation-based measure of the quality of counsel is based on the
Chambers and Partners rankings of U.S. law firms. We code a borrower’s law
firm as top-ranked in any given year if it was included within any tier of the
Chambers “Banking & Finance: Nationwide” rankings for the prior year.22 The
Chambers rankings cover a total of 21 law firms in each year.23
Setting the cut-off for elite-quality law firms at approximately the top 20
(or fewer) is justified by the fact that borrower-side representation is highly
concentrated in the syndicated loan market. Figure 1 depicts law firms’ priorfour-year market share of borrower-side leveraged-loan representation, in
ranked order for 2016. While the first few firms each hold a significant share
of the market, market share falls off rapidly thereafter. The top twenty firms
represent almost 60% of the market in aggregate.24
Figure 1. Top Law Firms’ Market Share of Borrower-Side Representation
for Leveraged Loans (2016).

The ranking based on Bloomberg data looks back to the prior four years of loan
volume, while the ranking using the Practical Law sample looks back only two years, because
the Practical Law database only begins in 2011. (The regressions using the latter metric are
therefore limited to credit agreements from 2013-2016, rather than from 2011-2016, in order
to construct the two-year look-back for market share.) Because loan volume was exceptionally
low in 2008 and 2009, we exclude those years in all calculations, instead looking back to the
immediately preceding years where applicable.
22 The current ranking is available at
http://www.chambersandpartners.com/12788/6/editorial/5/1 (last visited on June 28, 2016).
Unfortunately, the “Banking and Finance: Nationwide” category extends beyond syndicated
loans, and does not distinguish between borrower-side and lender-side work.
23 In the event that the borrower was represented by more than one law firm for the same
loan (as where local-counsel opinions were sought regarding collateral, for example), the
borrower is coded as having been represented by a top-ranked law firm if any of the
borrower’s law firms was top-ranked for that year. The borrower’s law firm was not reported
for 1,104 of the 4,164 loans in the sample. In each such instance, the borrower’s law firm is
coded as though it were not top-ranked, on the theory that it was not disclosed either because
the law firm was relatively unknown or because the borrower relied solely on in-house counsel
to negotiate the loan terms. As a robustness check, all observations for which the borrower’s
law firm was not reported were excluded from the sample in unreported regressions, which
yielded similar results to those reported here.
24 In unreported regressions, similar results were obtained using top 10 and top 15
rankings as cutoffs.
21
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Table 1 below presents summary statistics for the 2,982 leveraged loans in
the sample, which are used in the reported regressions. On average, private
equity-backed loans in the sample are larger than non-sponsored loans and are
more likely to have been (i) negotiated by a top-ranked law firm, (ii) secured,
and (iii) incurred in connection with an acquisition.
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Borrower
Sponsored by
Private
Equity Firm?
Sponsored

Number
of Loans
429
(14.4%)

Average
Loan Size
(in USD)
$718 million

Represented by
Top 20-Ranked
Law Firm (%)25
59.0%

Secured
Loan (%)
95.1%

AcquisitionRelated
Loan (%)
26.6%

Not sponsored

2,553
(85.6%)

$547 million

23.1%

72.0%

14.6%

Full sample

2,982
(100%)

$572 million

28.3%

75.2%

16.3%

Figures reported here using rankings for the metric based on Bloomberg-reported loan
volumes.
25
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B. Model and Results
A logit regression model is used here to test whether private-equity-owned
borrowers are more likely than public companies to select top-ranked counsel
for their syndicated loan transactions. The specification is as follows:
_

⋯

where each loan transactions is a separate observation, the logit function is the
natural logarithm of the odds ratio that the borrower will select top-ranked
finance counsel for that loan, α and β1 through βN are the scalar constant and
coefficients, respectively, to be estimated by the regression, Sponsored is an
indicator variable identifying whether the borrower is private equitysponsored, and X2 through XN are control variables capturing loan
characteristics that might affect the desirability of elite-quality counsel.
Specifically, the regression controls first for loan size, as we would expect
larger loans to be associated with higher-quality counsel, all else equal.
Acquisition-related loans might also call for higher-quality counsel, because the
acquisition itself may involve significant regulatory and litigation risk, and
contingencies associated with the acquisition increase the complexity of the
loan transaction.26 Syndicated loans that are secured are also relatively more
complex, thus potentially increasing the value to the borrower of more elite
counsel. In addition, loans to borrowers in certain industries may present
uniquely complex regulatory issues, thereby affecting choice of counsel.27
Finally, the debt markets recognize a significant divide between
investment-grade debt and below-investment grade (“high-yield” or
26 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS
OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2015) (finding that 93 percent

of all mergers and acquisitions transactions with targets valued over $100 million resulted in
litigation).
27 Under an adversarial model of transaction bargaining, one might also wish to control
for the quality of the agent’s counsel. The regressions reported herein do not do so, however,
because there were too few observations for which the agent’s counsel was reported. Further,
in the syndicated-loan market, it is not uncommon for the agent’s counsel to be selected only
after the borrower’s counsel has been selected, and, in many cases, subject to the borrower’s
approval. (Private equity firms in particular have been able to narrow the agent’s choice to
“designated lender counsel” that is hand-picked by the private equity firm.) Most importantly,
financing transactions should not be thought of as adversarial, zero-sum, negotiations. In
most cases, it is in the parties’ interests to maximize their joint aggregate surplus from the
transaction (such as by devising terms that lower the parties’ collective transaction costs), prior
to negotiating how that surplus should be split. See de Fontenay, supra note 7. Given that, the
relationship between the quality of borrower’s counsel and the quality of lender’s counsel need
not be linear.
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“leveraged”) debt in terms of risk, documentation, and creditors.28
Investment-grade loans commonly involve blue-chip borrowers and relatively
simple credit agreements with few covenants and other restrictions affecting
the borrower. Leveraged loans, by contrast, involve borrowers with a high
proportion of debt in their capital structure (either by choice or as a result of
financial distress), and are thus associated with complex credit agreements and
highly restrictive covenants.
The predicted effect of investment-grade status on the borrower’s choice
of counsel is unclear, however. The simpler investment-grade deals might
entail less incremental value to engaging higher-quality counsel, but
investment-grade issuers may have a greater ability to pay for high-quality
counsel on average. To address this distinction in the two types of syndicated
loans, the regressions reported here are limited to leveraged loans (loans rated
below investment-grade by the credit rating agencies), for a final sample size of
2,982 agreements. (Unreported regressions use the full sample of loans, but
control for whether a loan is rated investment-grade.)
Table 2 presents the regression results for the leveraged-loan sample, with
the three reported models differing only in the metric used to rank the law
firms. First, there is a large, positive, and statistically significant association
between the borrower’s status as a private equity-sponsored company and the
likelihood that the borrower will select elite-quality counsel. This result is
robust to the use of the three different measures of law-firm quality. The odds
that a borrower will be represented by a top-ranked law firm are approximately
three to four times higher (depending on the ranking metric) if the borrower is
private-equity-sponsored than if it is a public company. Second, among the
control variables, the size of the loan and whether it is secured both
significantly increase a borrower’s likelihood of selecting elite counsel, while
there was no statistically significant effect for whether the loan was issued in
connection with an acquisition, or, in unreported regressions using the full
sample, for whether the loan was investment-grade. Appendix A reports the
results of the same regressions, with the addition of industry control
variables.29

28 See STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 7, 13, 23 (2012), available at
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf.
29 Regression models with fixed effects for the year in which the loan was issued did not
generally produce statistically significant results for the year indicators and are omitted here.
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Results: Effect of Private Equity-Ownership
on Borrower’s Odds of Selecting Elite Counsel.
Top-Firm_1
Sponsored
ln(Loan Amount)
Acquisition Purpose
Secured Loan

N

4.184
(12.51)**
1.557
(10.59)**
1.066
(0.56)
1.882
(5.61)**
2,982

Top-Firm_2
2.925
(7.79)**
1.537
(8.75)**
1.041
(0.30)
1.536
(3.38)**
1,971

Top-Firm_3
3.747
(11.47)**
1.706
(12.42)**
1.000
(0.00)
1.711
(4.75)**
2,982

* Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05)
** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01)

Note: The reported logistic regression coefficients are odds ratios. Z statistics are in
parentheses.

Table 3. Variable Definitions.
Variable

Definition

Dependent Variable:
Top-Firm_1

Equal to 1 if the borrower’s law firm was among the top 20
borrower-side law firms for the year in which the loan was
issued, ranked according to aggregate market share of
borrower-side representation for leveraged loans over the
previous four years (excepting 2008-2009), using leveraged loan
volumes by law firm reported by Bloomberg. The sample
period for this model is 2011-2016.

Top-Firm_2

Equal to 1 if the borrower’s law firm was among the top 20
borrower-side law firms for the year in which the loan was
issued, ranked according to aggregate market share of
borrower-side representation for leveraged loans over the
previous two years, using leveraged loan volumes by law firm
from within the sample (Practical Law). The sample period for
this model is 2013-2016.

Top-Firm_3

Equal to 1 if the borrower’s law firm was listed in any tier of
the Chambers and Partners “Banking & Finance: Nationwide”
rankings in the prior year. The sample period for this model is
2011-2016.

12
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Independent Variables:
Sponsored

Equal to 1 if the borrower was private equity-owned when the
loan transaction closed.

Ln(Loan Amount)

Natural logarithm of the principal amount of the loan facility in
U.S. dollars.

Acquisition Purpose

Equal to 1 if the loan was issued at least in part to finance an
acquisition.

Secured Loan

Equal to 1 if any part of the loan was secured by the borrower’s
assets.

II. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
Controlling for loan characteristics, then, public companies appear to
select lower-ranked counsel for their bank-debt financings than do privateequity-owned companies.30 Before proceeding, however, a clarification is in
order as to who selects outside counsel for each group. The regression sample
consists of large U.S. syndicated loans by private-equity-sponsored companies
and (non-sponsored) public companies. Thus, in the former case, the
regression estimates the quality of financing counsel engaged by private equityowned companies (the “portfolio companies”), rather than by the private
equity sponsors (the investment professionals) or the private equity funds (the
investment vehicles) themselves. The goal is to obtain a sample of
organizations (in this case, large operating companies) of comparable size and
other characteristics. Yet for large financing transactions such as those
covered by the sample, borrower’s counsel is, in practice, selected by the
private equity sponsor, rather than by the portfolio company itself, even
though the latter bears the debt.31 In the case of public companies, borrower’s
counsel is typically selected by the company’s general counsel (if any),32 subject
in some cases to management-imposed restrictions discussed in Part II.B. As
we will see, this difference in decision-making agency between the two groups
may explain much of the discrepancy in the quality of counsel that they select.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that private equity sponsors hire top-tier law firms
when acquiring companies, while the target companies (often public companies) do so less
often. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 534–38
(2009).
31 See id.
32 See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (1985); Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 960, 971 (2005).
30
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A. The Private Equity Perspective
Returning to the regression results, what factors explain the two groups’
differing choices of counsel, and what, if anything, can be said about whether
these choices are value-maximizing? Somewhat surprisingly, the latter
question is the easier to address, and we begin there. Even before identifying
what drives their choice of counsel, we have good reasons to believe that
private equity firms act relatively efficiently in favoring elite counsel for their
financing transactions.
First, the stakes are generally higher for private equity firms than for public
companies. Private equity-owned companies are, on average, significantly
more leveraged than their public-company counterparts.33 Any marginal
increase in transaction value that an elite law firm can provide represents, on
average, a greater overall economic advantage for a private equity-owned
company than it would for a comparably-sized public company. Simply put,
private equity-owned companies will, on average, get more bang for their buck
from an improvement in financing terms than would a comparable public
company.
Second, we should expect private equity firms to internalize the costs and
benefits of their portfolio companies’ legal representation relatively well,
meaning that the economic effects of choice of counsel flow through to the
party that ultimately makes that choice. Indeed, as the sole or majority
shareholder of its portfolio companies, a private equity fund’s interests are
largely aligned with those of its portfolio companies.34 Moving up the ladder,
the typical compensation structure—which provides for a twenty-percent
carried interest—ensures that the private equity firm (sponsor) itself is highly
motivated to increase portfolio companies’ value.35 In turn, the carried interest
is typically shared among a relatively small number of individuals.36 The
33 See Ulf Axelson, Tim Jenkinson, Per Strömberg, & Michael S. Weisbach, Borrow Cheap,
Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts, 68 J. FIN. 2223, 2239 (2013).
34 But see Gretchen Morgenson, When Private Equity Firms Give Retirees the Short End, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2015, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/business/retirement/when-private-equity-firms-giveretirees-the-short-end.html?_r=0 (discussing examples of private equity firms receiving
discounts from law firms on legal work pertaining to the firm itself, while their fund investors
are charged premium rates by the same firms for transactional work). Such volume discounts
for the private equity firm, rather than the fund, could incentivize private equity firms to select
higher-quality law firms for the fund work than would be optimal. In October 2015,
Blackstone, a major private equity sponsor, reached a settlement with the SEC for its alleged
failure to disclose such a differential fee structure negotiated with its law firm.
35 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 121, 124 (2009).
36 See id. at 123 (noting that even the largest private equity firms are “still small relative to
the firms in which they invest.”); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS.
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private equity ownership and compensation structure thus maintains relatively
high-powered incentives for the individuals responsible for affecting firm
value, in contrast to the diffuse management incentive problems that plague
large public companies.
Third, private equity firms are sophisticated, high-volume players for this
type of loan transaction. If elite law firms do indeed increase the value of their
loan transactions, then private equity firms are particularly well poised to
recognize and to capitalize on this advantage.
In sum, we have good reasons to believe that private equity firms perform
relatively well at maximizing value through their selection of counsel, though
the data presented herein cannot resolve the question. Private equity firms’
preference for higher-ranked law firms therefore suggests that such firms
provide them, on average, with a better economic deal—even taking into
account higher legal fees. Equivalently, private equity firms are unlikely to be
simply overpaying for legal services. Their preference for higher-ranked firms
thus provides a benchmark for evaluating the selection of counsel by public
companies, the task to which we now turn.

B. Is The Private Equity Calculus Generalizable?
If we accept the premise that private equity firms select the quality of their
counsel relatively efficiently, we are left with two alternative hypotheses for the
finding that public companies opt for lower-ranked financing counsel:
1)

High-quality law firms benefit private-equity-owned companies
more than they do public companies, all else being equal; or

2)

High-quality law firms benefit private equity-owned companies
and public companies equally, but public companies choose
lower-ranked firms for non-value-maximizing reasons.

This section discusses the first hypothesis, while the second is addressed in
Part C below. There are two principal reasons why elite counsel might, on
average, benefit private equity firms more than another types of corporate
clients. First, private equity firms’ raison d’être is to acquire portfolio companies
and to dispose of them at a premium. They are therefore involved in mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) activity far more frequently than are public
companies, on average. Because private equity M&A is leveraged, each of
these acquisition transactions is typically accompanied by a simultaneous debt
financing transaction. Thus, to the extent that private equity firms select elite
counsel for their financing transactions, this may simply be a reflection of their
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 70.
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antecedent need for elite M&A counsel.37 Indeed, large M&A transactions
often involve complex regulatory concerns (such as antitrust and securities
regulation), litigation risk (shareholder lawsuits and appraisal proceedings), and
tactical maneuvering (such as takeover defenses and auction processes), for
which an experienced law firm proves invaluable.38
The regression model seeks to minimize the potentially distorting influence
of M&A by controlling for whether a loan was issued in connection with an
acquisition. (Interestingly, the latter had no statistically significant effect on
the borrower’s likelihood of choosing top-ranked counsel in our results.) This
does not fully address the problem, however. Imagine, for example, that a
private equity firm hires an elite firm for its acquisition of a particular target
company and the accompanying financing. If the target—now a portfolio
company—later opts to refinance its debt, the new debt is no longer coded as
acquisition-related. Nonetheless, the initial choice of elite counsel for the
acquisition likely increases the probability that elite counsel will be used for the
refinancing: clearly there are economies of scale in using the same law firm for
a given company’s subsequent financings. Thus, even controlling for
acquisition-related loans, private equity-owned companies may be more likely
to select elite counsel for their financings than companies starting from a clean
slate.
A second potential explanation for why elite counsel might benefit private
equity-sponsored companies and public companies differentially might be that,
contrary to a key assumption of the regression model, loans to the two groups
effectively amount to two different legal products. Thus, for example, the
added complexity of private-equity-related financings (as compared to “plain
vanilla” public-company loans) may be sufficiently large that elite counsel
simply adds more value, all else being equal. The financing contingencies
associated with leveraged acquisitions create additional risks for creditors and
complicate both the structuring and the documentation. In order to minimize
heterogeneity in the sample from legal complexity, the regression model
controls for whether a loan is acquisition-related, secured, or (in unreported
regressions) investment-grade. While such controls are designed to achieve
better matching in the sample, they may nonetheless be imperfect or
insufficient correctives.39

See Davidoff, supra note 25.
See C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger and Acquisition
Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 192 (2013) (finding an association between the use of top-tier
law firms in M&A transactions and better client outcomes).
39 Notwithstanding, simply pointing to the fact that private-equity-sponsored loans tend
to involve more complex terms does not on its own entail that such loans should be treated as
a different class of legal work from public-company loans: the effect may be at least partly
endogenous, reflecting the influence of more elite counsel for private equity deals.
37
38
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C. The Public Company Perspective
This section assumes that elite counsel does on average add more value to
all clients’ loan transactions than lower-ranked counsel, and identifies possible
explanations for why public companies are nonetheless less likely than private
equity firms to employ elite counsel.40 If private equity firms are correct, hiring
a lower-ranked firm is inefficient—tantamount to passing up free money.
How, then, do we account for the choice made by public companies?
1. General Counsel Decision-Making.
One approach is to hypothesize a variety of inefficiencies in the demand
for legal services by public companies. First, public companies may select their
outside counsel sub-optimally due to a pure information problem, preventing
them from accurately gauging law firms’ quality or the relationship between
law firm quality and transaction value. Certainly some degree of information
asymmetry exists between companies and law firms as the former contract for
legal services.41 A prime example of credence goods,42 legal services are
notoriously difficult to value. Specifically, if the general counsels of public
companies are unsophisticated or inexperienced at weighing the costs and
benefits of outside counsel services, they may well select their counsel poorly.
Perhaps general counsels, often far removed from their days in private
practice, underestimate the value of top-ranked firms’ services, and law firms
are unable to convey these benefits convincingly. Similarly, general counsels
40 The finding that public companies are incentivized to pick lower-quality firms than is
optimal stands in contrast to the oft-told story that companies hire prestigious firms as cover
for their own decisions or actions. See, e.g., Brian Uzzi et al., Your Client Relationships and
Reputation: Weighing the Worth of Social Ties: Embeddedness and the Price of Legal Services in the Large
Law Firm Market, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW
PERSPECTIVES 91, 115 (Laura Empson ed., 2007) (concluding that “in-house counsel…use
[law-firm] status to justify a hiring decision to their superiors or to cover themselves in case
something goes wrong with the deal even though a lower cost firm of equal quality is
available.”). The difference may turn on the degree of risk and visibility involved: for low-risk
transactions such as a routine loan financing—even a very large one—general counsels may
spend too little on their law firms, consistent with this Article’s findings. For high-risk, highvisibility transactions, by contrast, general counsels may be personally incentivized to have the
company overspend on law-firm quality. See also Deborah A. DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and
the Roles of General Counsel, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 463 (2012) (discussing the interrelationship
between the reputations of the general counsel and the corporation it serves).
41 See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2001) (“[P]rincipals (clients) have little information about what their
agents are doing”); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE
OF LEGAL SERVICES 148—49 (2008) (noting how the incentives of law firms and their clients
may diverge).
42 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16
J.L. & ECON. 67, 67 (1973) (defining credence goods).
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may be overly confident in their in-house staff’s abilities and therefore spend
too little on outside counsel.
As far as it goes, this argument seems unsatisfactory. The general counsels
of the largest public companies are often taken directly from elite law firms,
and thus could hardly be described as unsophisticated about the work
performed by such firms. Further, it is unclear why a lack of sophistication
would result in a systematic preference for lower-ranked counsel. Indeed,
plausible arguments exist for the opposite result, with unsophisticated general
counsels biased in favor of higher-ranked counsel: precisely because they lack
information, unsophisticated general counsels might be most likely to rely on
rankings as the best proxy for quality and to seek the highest-ranked counsel.
A more promising set of explanations derives from a second type of
inefficiency in the demand for legal services, namely the agency costs
associated with public-company general counsels. Assume here that a general
counsel is well aware that spending more on a law firm should be expected to
result in a better economic deal for the company, even net of legal fees.
Nonetheless, she proceeds to staff the transaction either with a less expensive
law firm or with the company’s in-house lawyers. While this choice is
suboptimal from the perspective of the company’s shareholders, it may
nonetheless advance the general counsel’s private interests. Certainly the
general counsel has at least some incentive to maximize the corporation’s
value, whether for self-interested reasons (such as increasing the value of her
stock options and ensuring her continued employment) or simply acting as a
faithful agent of the company. Yet the general counsel’s private incentives also
include concerns such as pleasing management and maximizing the visibility
and prestige of the in-house counsel team within the company.43
Thus, general counsels may tend to favor in-house counsel over outside
counsel or to hire cheaper outside counsel for a transaction for several reasons.
First, once in-house staff has been hired, the general counsel has strong
incentives to see it utilized to capacity and even expanded: steering
transactional work to in-house lawyers reduces the unpleasant prospect of staff
layoffs and increases their visibility and influence with the rest of the
management team.44 As the company’s chief legal officer and the person
responsible for hiring and overseeing in-house counsel, the general counsel
may well view his key task—second only to avoiding catastrophic legal risk for
the company—as justifying, on a daily basis, the existence of the in-house legal
team.
Second, as a mechanism to limit discretionary spending, within many
companies the board of directors or upper-level management must approve—
43 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise Risk,
and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495 (2012)
44 See David Wilkins, Teams of Rivals: Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney/Client Relationship, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2009 669 (2010).
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formally or informally—the general counsel’s decision to hire outside counsel.
Similarly, many general counsels are restricted to selecting from among a preapproved, short list of law firms for the company’s legal work.45 Absent
express permission from the board, this prevents a general counsel from
engaging a different firm for a transaction on a one-off basis, even if—in his
view—it would be the best firm for the job. Such approval requirements
should lead general counsels to spend less on outside counsel than is optimal:
they may be reluctant to expend their political capital within the company on a
decision that only provides them with highly attenuated private benefits.
In simple cost-benefit terms, the costs to the company of hiring elite
counsel are immediate, tangible, and incurred with certainty, while the benefits
of doing so are typically delayed, intangible, uncertain, and impossible to
measure precisely even after the fact.46 Persuading her company to engage
more expensive counsel may thus prove difficult for a general counsel, even if
she truly believes that the benefits outweigh the costs. Indeed, whereas the inhouse legal department effectively amounts to a fixed (and sunk) cost, legal
fees for outside counsel represent an additional, highly visible cash outlay.47 At
the same time, the board and senior management are poorly positioned to
appreciate the benefits of better counsel. Such benefits cannot be measured in
any particular instance: the output of a law firm’s efforts is largely intangible—
it is difficult to ascribe a cash value to having a particular covenant in a loan
agreement, for example—and even were that not the case, measuring the
added economic benefit of a higher quality law firm requires a calculation
based on an unknowable counterfactual scenario, namely what transaction
value a lower-quality firm would have produced on behalf of the client.
Finally, even if we expect that, on average, paying more for an elite law firm
will result in a greater transaction value ex post, there is no assurance ex ante that
this will be the case. (Stated differently, while the expected transaction value
should be higher with a higher-ranked law firm, the actual, realized value need
not be: there is some risk involved.) A risk-averse general counsel might thus
prefer less expensive counsel, in order to avoid shouldering the blame vis-à-vis
the rest of the management team if the costs ultimately end up outweighing
the benefits.48 All told, the general counsel’s private cost-benefit calculus may,
at the margins, lead her to take the path of least resistance (and risk) and opt
45

(2001).

See, e.g., LARRY SMITH, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: HOW BUSINESSES BUY LEGAL SERVICES 173

See Coates, supra note 36, at 1311-13 (summarizing the difficulties in assessing the costs
and benefits of legal advice in the context of initial public offerings).
47 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to
Law Firm Short-Termism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (noting that “institutional clients have
begun to wonder whether they should use less prestigious, lower-cost firms…”).
48 As discussed, in other settings (such as high-stakes litigation or a hostile acquisition),
general counsel risk aversion might tilt in favor of engaging more expensive counsel. See Uzzi
et al., supra note 35 at 115.
46
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for less expensive counsel.
All this to say that, due to agency and influence costs, the general counsels
of large public companies arguably internalize the costs and benefits of their
companies’ choice of transactional counsel less than do private equity firms,
and that, consistent with our empirical results, this can prompt them to
underspend on outside counsel.49 Public-company general counsels act within
large, bureaucratic organizations, and have conflicting allegiances to
shareholders, management, and their in-house staff. Large corporations are by
all accounts intensely political environments, and we should not be surprised
that, like all other corporate management positions, the general counsel role
engenders agency and influence costs.50 In this particular case, it may lead
general counsels to make suboptimal decisions in selecting counsel for major
transactions.
2. Relationship Lawyering 2.0?
An alternative, and less troubling, explanation for the discrepancy between
the law firms chosen by private equity-owned companies and public
companies deserves mention. “Relationship lawyering” refers to corporate
clients’ practice of directing virtually all of their legal work to a single law firm
(or a very small number of law firms), over a long period of time.
Commentators have noted (and often decried) the contemporary decline of
relationship lawyering for corporate clients,51 with a client’s long-term
relationship with a single firm being replaced by one-off, impersonal
engagements with numerous firms.52 Yet decline does not equate to
49 While large private equity firms are likely to have general counsels themselves, their inhouse staff (if any) is negligible in size compared to that of large public companies, as the
private equity compensation scheme provides incentives to keep staffing to a barebones
minimum. Further, they face significantly higher-powered incentives than their counterparts
at public companies, thus benefitting more from any given increase in firm value. They are
thus significantly less likely to suffer from the agency and influence costs of public-company
in-house legal departments.
50 The seminal treatment of intra-firm agency costs and influence costs is from
Williamson (1991) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990), respectively. See Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES
ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 58 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990)
(defining “influence costs” as the costs of political activity within firms); Oliver E. Williamson,
The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features, in THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1985).
See also Geoffrey Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in
Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 807 (2010).
51 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990); Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How
Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2002).
52 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 I/S: J.L. &
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disappearance. Under certain conditions, using a relationship firm (or, as may
be more common today, two or three relationship firms) for a corporate
transaction may be the optimal choice for a company, even if the relationship
firm is relatively less experienced with that type of transaction.53 Even
assuming that an elite firm with significant transactional experience might, for
example, obtain better deal terms for the company, the cost savings from using
its relationship firm could conceivably outweigh this. This would be due not
simply to the relationship firm’s lower fees, but more importantly to its
familiarity with the company’s unique regulatory issues and its ready access to
information within the company. Indeed, the traditional justification for
relationship lawyering is the greater (and less costly) information flow between
client and law firm, relative to one-off engagements, resulting in lower
transaction costs.54
Thus, while we can posit that a large public company is likely to do better
on a financing transaction using an elite firm rather than a lower-ranked firm
on a one-off basis, the same is not necessarily true if the comparison is between
using an elite firm on a one-off basis and using a lower-ranked relationship
firm. Ironically, in fact, private equity firms themselves can be considered
champions of the relationship-firm model, in a sense. Most of the largest
private equity firms direct the bulk of their business to one or two law firms.55
However, much of this has to do with such firms’ long-standing experience
with, and market knowledge of, M&A and financing transactions. Simply put,
the relationship firms of the largest private equity sponsors are the most elite
law firms,56 making it difficult to parse the specific sources of value that they
provide. Finally, there is another key distinction to be drawn between
relationship lawyering involving private equity firms and public operating
companies. While public companies’ relationship law firms are familiar with
the operating companies themselves, in the private equity context the
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 33 (2012) (finding that companies have begun spreading legal work
across a greater number of law firms); David B. Wilkins, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going
Global? A Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 251, 258 (2012) (noting general counsels’ ability to make several law firms compete for
business).
53 See John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms and Lawyers: Evidence of the Evolving
Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 999 (2011) (finding that, while
large corporations today use several law firms, their relationships with such firms tend to
persist over time); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2067, 2070 (2010) (describing a new stage
in the evolution of law firm/client relations, moving from impersonal, one-off spotcontracting to something akin to strategic partnerships).
54 See Gilson, supra note 46.
55 See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 535–37
(2009) (describing the persistent relationships between large private equity firms and a small
set of elite law firms).
56 See id.
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relationship law firms are familiar with the private equity firm, but not
necessarily with the portfolio companies that they acquire.57 The informational
efficiencies from the law firm/client relationship should therefore differ in
kind, further complicating the comparison.
In short, if the agency-cost account is correct, public companies are likely
under-spending on legal counsel for their major corporate transactions, and
thus forgoing better economic outcomes. If instead the relationship-lawyering
account is the correct one, then the discrepancy in law firm usage between
private equity firms and public companies may be relatively benign or even
efficient. Private equity firms get the benefit of better deal terms by hiring
top-tier, repeat-player law firms, while public companies may, in some cases,
maximize their transaction surplus by sticking with their lower-ranked
relationship law firm(s), which reduces information costs.58
The answer depends on how skilled public companies are at weighing the
costs and benefits of never defecting from their relationship firms, and this
Article’s empirical results alone do not provide the answer. For the reasons
discussed above, however, we might suspect that public companies tend to
place too much emphasis on transaction costs, due to their greater salience,
while discounting the true benefits of higher-quality law firms. We should be
particularly skeptical of companies’ attempts to lower out-of-pocket costs for
the very largest transactions, for which transaction costs are, on a relative basis,
less significant.59 Thus, there is reason to doubt whether companies that
employ their lower-ranked relationship firms for major transactions are—
absent truly significant, company-specific risks—correctly balancing the
associated costs and benefits.
III. CASE STUDY: A TALE OF FOUR FINANCINGS
Specific examples starkly illustrate the divergence in legal representation
between private-equity-sponsored and (non-sponsored) public companies
identified in the regression results from Part I. Table 4 below provides a (nonFor many reasons, it is usually infeasible for private equity firms to engage law firms
that are already very familiar with their portfolio companies. For example, if a private equity
firm is seeking to make an acquisition, then the target corporation’s long-standing counsel
would either be representing the seller or would be conflicted in the transaction, and the seller
would have little incentive to waive the conflict.
58 Of course, we are left with the question of why public companies appear to have lowerranked relationship law firms than do private equity sponsors. The most plausible answer is
that large, public operating companies are more likely than private equity firms to generate
routine legal work (such as negotiating commercial contract forms or litigating employment
disputes) for which the cost of elite-quality counsel is not justified.
59 See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 507 (noting that for large transactions, “legal fees are
relatively small compared to overall transaction costs and benefits.”).
57
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exhaustive) list of multi-billion-dollar syndicated loans for which major public
corporations chose to be represented by law firms falling outside the elite
circle of U.S. borrower-side finance counsel.
Table 4. Public Company Legal Representation for Syndicated Loans.
Borrower
Reynolds American Inc.
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Duke Energy Corporation
McKesson Corporation
Halliburton Company
Constellation Brands, Inc.
Fidelity National Information Services
MetLife, Inc.
National Oilwell Varco, Inc.
Philip Morris International Inc.
Apache Corporation
Noble Energy, Inc.
Hologic, Inc.
ARRIS Group, Inc.
Universal Health Services, Inc.
Air Lease Corporation
American Airlines, Inc.
Jabil Circuit, Inc.

Loan Size
$9 billion
$7 billion
$6 billion
$5.5 billion
$4.5 billion
$4.4 billion
$4 billion
$4 billion
$3.5 billion
$3.5 billion
$3.5 billion
$3 billion
$2.8 billion
$2.8 billion
$2.6 billion
$2.1 billion
$2.1 billion
$2 billion

Year
2014
2015
2011
2013
2015
2013
2013
2014
2012
2015
2015
2011
2012
2015
2014
2014
2013
2015

CenturyLink, Inc.

$2 billion

2012

QVC, Inc.
United Air Lines, Inc.
PPG Industries, Inc.
Lowe’s Companies, Inc.
Iron Mountain Incorporated
Supervalu Inc.
Steel Dynamics, Inc.
Patterson Companies, Inc.
PTC Inc.
Intuit Inc.
Northrop Grumman Corporation

$2 billion
$1.9 billion
$1.8 billion
$1.75 billion
$1.75 billion
$1.7 billion
$1.5 billion
$1.5 billion
$1.5 billion
$1.5 billion
$1.5 billion

2013
2013
2015
2014
2015
2012
2014
2015
2014
2016
2011

Borrower Law Firm
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
Hogan Lovells US LLP
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.
Morrison & Forester LLP
Baker Botts L.L.P.
Nixon Peabody LLP
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
Haynes and Boone, LLP
Hunton & Williams LLP
Porter & Hedges, LLP
Thompson & Knight L.L.P.
Brown Rudnick LLP
Troutman Sanders LLP
Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw & Pittman LLP
Holland & Knight LLP
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent,
Carrère & Denègre LLP
Sherman & Howard L.L.C.
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP
K&L Gates LLP
Moore & Van Allen PLLC
Sullivan & Worcester LLP
Dorsey & Whitney LLP
Barrett & McNagny, LLP
Briggs and Morgan, P.A.
Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP
Fenwick & West LLP
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

This Part III examines the various theories of how public companies select
counsel in practice, using a brief case study. Specifically, it explores the
decision by four major U.S. public companies to select un-ranked borrower’s
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counsel for the loan transactions listed in Table 4 above. Each involved a loan
facility exceeding a billion dollars, such that the economic impact of the actual
loan terms was very high, while the cost of transaction counsel would have
been relatively insignificant. This has two implications. First, with loans of
that size, any incremental improvement in transaction value that counsel could
provide would very likely outweigh the additional cost of elite firms.60 In other
words, better counsel should, in expectation, pay for itself. Second, we can
safely assume that these companies had the ability to pay for any counsel of
their choosing.61 Therefore, in examining these companies’ decision to opt for
relatively lower-ranked counsel, the appropriate inquiry is limited to whether
the expected economic loss in transaction value was offset by some other
plausible benefit from their choice of counsel.

A. Berkshire Hathaway
With a market capitalization of nearly $350 billion and an astonishing
record of beating the U.S. stock market’s performance over a fifty-year period,
Berkshire Hathaway has long been a company of superlatives. As the third
largest public company in the United States, however, Berkshire’s spending on
professional services is far from lavish. For its $8 billion borrowing in
November 2009—used to finance Berkshire’s acquisition of Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Corporation—the conglomerate selected as its counsel
Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP,62 a comparatively small though highly-regarded
law firm.63 The connection between Berkshire and Munger Tolles is no
accident: Charlie Munger, the legendary Berkshire director with a near fortyyear tenure, was one of the founders of Munger Tolles in 1962.64
Nonetheless, the decision to use Munger Tolles for such a large financing
is far from self-evident, even putting aside the law firm’s moderate size.
Munger Tolles is primarily known for its elite litigation practice, rather than for
See id. (noting that transaction costs are less important for larger transactions).
A common problem with analyses of consumers’ revealed preferences is the difficulty
of disentangling ability and willingness to pay for a particular good. In the case studies herein,
there were no meaningful constraints on ability to pay for counsel, given the size of the
corporations at issue.
62 See $8,000,000,000 Credit Agreement Among Berkshire Hathaway Inc., The Lenders
Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Nov. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/934612/000119312509238536/dex3.htm.
63 The firm has approximately 200 attorneys across all of its offices.
64 See Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement (May 2, 2015) (hereinafter “Berkshire
Proxy Statement”), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312515091378/d854690ddef14a.
htm. Ronald Olson, also a Berkshire director (since 1997), is another founder of Munger
Tolles and remains a partner of the firm to this day. Id.
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transactional work.65 More to the point, while Munger Tolles can credibly
claim to offer highly sophisticated, bespoke service to its clients, it cannot
claim to have the same grasp of the “market” terms of large loan transactions
as the elite, (generally) New York-based, law firms that dominate the
syndicated-loan market—nor the same experience drafting and negotiating
them. Compared to such firms, Munger Tolles has a decidedly low-volume,
low-market-share loan practice. Yet for an $8 billion deal, the additional
transaction costs (if any) involved in hiring a high-market-share firm over
Munger Tolles would be truly negligible.
How, then, can we account for Berkshire’s choice of firm in this instance?
One possibility is that it reflected one or more conflicts of interest. Two of
the law firm’s founders, Charlie Munger and Ronald Olson, are currently
directors of Berkshire Hathaway, with tenures of nearly forty and twenty years,
respectively.66 While Charlie Munger is no longer associated with the law firm,
Ronald Olson is still a practicing partner. Berkshire’s decision to stick with
Munger Tolles for its transactional work might thus be an example of modest
cronyism, though there is no evidence that this is indeed the case.
A far more promising explanation is to point to the unusual culture of
Berkshire Hathaway, which puts a significant premium on handling matters
internally and with barebones staffing. Its longstanding CEO, Warren Buffett,
is strikingly and vocally averse to intermediation.67 Though his disdain is
primarily directed at investment banks,68 it arguably extends to law firms on
the same principle, driving him to rely minimally on counsel by opting for a
relatively small firm. The question, of course, is whether this strategy is
ultimately beneficial to the company. If Berkshire’s decision to eschew
investment banks, for example, actually leads its potential acquisition targets to
do the same, the company might reap significant benefits by acquiring
companies at a significantly lower share premium than it otherwise would.69 It
seems unlikely that opting for less-experienced financing counsel could reap
similar benefits for the company, however. Moreover, the benefit of hiring
experienced counsel would seem particularly important in this case, given that

See http://www.chambersandpartners.com/12059/717/editorial/5/1#org_3535.
See Berkshire Proxy Statement, supra note 60.
67 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire versus KKR: Intermediary Influence and Competition,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 101 (2015).
68
See Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2014 Letter to Shareholders, available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2014ltr.pdf.
69 See Neil Irwin, Why Warren Buffett Is Worth $72 Billion and You’re Not, N.Y. TIMES (March
2, 2105), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/upshot/why-warren-buffett-isworth-72-billion-and-youre-not-two-theories-on-berkshire-hathaway.html. The benefit to
Berkshire comes not from the transaction-cost savings of avoiding investment banks, but from
the fact that, without an investment bank to represent it, the target company is likely to be sold
for a lower price.
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Berkshire almost never issues debt70 and therefore has little internal experience
with the full range of contractual terms on which such financing can be
obtained.
While Berkshire may be correct to be suspicious of the incentives of
intermediaries in general, adhering to that principle in every instance betrays a
near-ideological aversion to transaction costs that may not be valuemaximizing for each individual transaction. Perhaps, then, Berkshire’s choice
of counsel is best viewed as part of its broad strategies of signaling to potential
acquisition targets that it favors long-term business relationships and of leaving
Warren Buffett’s minimalist mark on every aspect of the company’s culture—
strategies that, rightly or wrongly, have been wildly attractive to investors.

B. Philip Morris International and Northrop Grumman
As behemoths of the tobacco and defense industries, respectively, Philip
Morris International71 and Northrop Grumman72 have both recently engaged
financing counsel outside the top ranks for multi-billion-dollar loans. For its
$3.5 billion revolving credit facility in 2015, Philip Morris chose Hunton &
Williams LLP, its primary and longstanding U.S. relationship firm. In contrast,
Northrop Grumman does not appear to have relied on a relationship firm for
its $1.5 billion loan in 2011: based on searches of the public record, the
interactions between the company and its selected counsel, Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton LLP, are limited and of relatively recent origin. In both
cases, geographic proximity appears to have played a role: Philip Morris’s U.S.
operations and Hunton & Williams are both products of Richmond, Virginia,73
while Sheppard Mullin74 and Northrop Grumman75 were both founded in the
Los Angeles area, where Northrop Grumman was also headquartered until
See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 105.
See Credit Agreement Relating to a US$3,500,000,000 Revolving Credit Facility Among
Philip Morris International Inc., The Initial Lenders Named Therein, Citibank
International Limited, and Citibank, N.A. (Oct. 1, 2015), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1413329/000119312515337340/d49908dex101.h
tm.
72 See Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman
Corporation, The Lenders Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Sept. 8, 2011)
(hereinafter “Northrop Grumman Credit Agreement”), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000119312511247019/d230126dex101.htm.
73 See http://www.vault.com/company-profiles/law/hunton-williams-llp/companyoverview.aspx.
74 See http://www.vault.com/company-profiles/law/sheppard-mullin-richter-hamptonllp/company-overview.aspx.
75 See Northrop Grumman Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2015) at 1,
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000113342115000008/noc12312014x10k.htm.
70
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recently.
Both Northrop Grumman and Philip Morris operate in industries with
significant regulatory burdens and public or private enforcement risk. Further,
as a defense firm, much of Northrop Grumman’s work product and contracts
cannot be publicly disclosed,76 and approximately 85 percent of its sales are to
a single customer—the U.S. government—further complicating the task of
securing financing.77 Companies operating in a costly and highly specialized
regulatory environment are surely potential candidates for either (1) developing
close, long-term relationships with a small number of law firms or (2) steering
work to a large in-house staff. Here, Philip Morris opted for the first strategy,
while Northrop Grumman appears to have chosen the second.78
When is a client justified in using a relationship firm over superior finance
counsel? The advantage of relationship firms is their intimate knowledge of
their clients, including in particular their unique regulatory and litigation risks.
Yet even accepting that Philip Morris has benefitted from cultivating a
relationship firm in the first place, it is unclear why this would preclude it from
using elite financing counsel in a one-off transaction—or, in fact, from using
both its relationship firm and elite financing counsel—particularly for a loan of
this size.
Northrop Grumman’s decision to rely on the combination of in-house
counsel and a firm with relatively little experience in syndicated lending is also
surprising.79 Because out-of-pocket transaction costs are small in proportion
to loans of this size, Northrop Grumman could have engaged elite finance
counsel to complement its in-house regulatory expertise. In fact, the company
subsequently did just that: it used top-ranked Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
for each of its three syndicated loan financings in 2012, 2013, and 2015.80
See id. at 5 (referring to the company’s “restricted” programs).
Id. at 7.
78 The fact that one of the borrower’s legal opinions was provided by an officer of
Northrop Grumman suggests that its in-house lawyers were involved in the financing. See
Northrop Grumman Credit Agreement, supra note 68.
79 The Sheppard Mullin website touts the firm’s experience with government contracting
and corporate transactions for the aerospace and defense industry.
See
http://www.sheppardmullin.com/aerospace-and-defense (last visited December 2, 2015)
(“Our attorneys have 100+ years combined experience serving aerospace and defense industry
clients…We know the industry and the environment in which participants compete.”).
80 See 364-Day Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman Corporation, The Lenders
Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000113342112000038/exhibit101.htm;
Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman Corporation, The Lenders Party Thereto, and
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000119312513353825/d591544dex101.h
tm; Amended and Restated Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman Corporation, The
Lenders Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Jul. 8, 2015), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000119312515249197/d95748dex101.h
tm.
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Because the defense and tobacco industries are considered unsavory by
some, an alternative explanation would be that the most elite law firms were
simply less willing to provide legal services to these two companies. The
motive for law firms to avoid such clients involves some combination of
reputational concerns, the express or implied wishes of existing clients engaged
in socially responsible investing (such as pension funds, foundations, and
university endowments), and the firms’ recruiting appeal to graduates of the
most elite law schools. There does not appear to be any evidence that these
companies are indeed “untouchables” from law firms’ perspective, however.
In other contexts such as litigation, it is routinely assumed that the lure of
immediate profits generally outweighs law firms’ qualms about their clients’
reputations. In both cases, then, we are simply left to wonder whether
behavioral factors (such as inertia or personal preferences) or agency costs
played any role in the selection of counsel.

C. Lowe’s
For its $1.75 billion credit facility, which closed in August 2014, Lowe’s
Companies relied on Moore & Van Allen PLLC,81 a Charlotte-based law firm
with just over 300 attorneys across its various offices. Lowe’s itself is
headquartered just outside of Charlotte, in Moorseville, North Carolina.
Lowe’s Companies’ choice of finance counsel is striking, and not simply as
another apparent example of relationship lawyering. (Moore & Van Allen has
represented Lowe’s in prior financings.) Particularly intriguing is the fact that
Moore & Van Allen known for representing lenders and underwriters, rather
than borrowers. (In the year in which the Lowe’s credit facility closed, by
syndicated-loan volume Moore & Van Allen was ranked 17th among all U.S.
law firms for lender-side representation and 86th for borrower-side
representation.) With major lender clients such as Bank of America, Moore &
Van Allen has a well-established reputation for elite-quality lending work.
Among law firms, there is a divide between those that tend to represent
major borrowers (such as private equity firms and Fortune 500 operating
companies) and those that tend to represent the major banks that arrange or
underwrite their loans.82 Of course, experience with lender-side work is
undoubtedly useful for borrower-side work as well. Rather, the concern from
See Credit Agreement Among Lowe’s Companies, Inc., Bank of America, N.A., and
The Other Lenders Party Thereto (Aug. 29, 2014), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/60667/000006066714000146/exhibit101.htm.
82 The same type of divide holds true to a lesser extent for mergers and acquisitions, with
certain firms developing reputations for representing financial buyers such as private equity
firms, and others specializing in representing major operating companies on the sell-side. See
Davidoff, supra note 25.
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the client’s perspective with crossing the divide should be that, for reputational
reasons, a lender-side firm might not be willing to bargain aggressively when
representing a borrower, in order to protect its standard negotiating positions
when it represents lenders. Thus, in this instance, the company chose a law
firm that had business interests potentially adverse to its own.
To conclude this Part III, these four case studies highlight the wide range
of motivations for companies to select their counsel. For loans exceeding a
billion dollars, the economic calculus would seem relatively straightforward:
borrowing companies should engage elite financing counsel, because, given the
transaction size, the expected benefit in transaction terms should outweigh the
negligible difference in legal fees. Yet in each of these four cases, a major
public company chose financing counsel outside the top rankings to represent
it, and in at least one case also relied on its in-house staff. While we cannot
draw definitive conclusions from case studies, these examples illustrate that, in
practice, many factors falling outside a one-off, transaction-specific costbenefit analysis can affect major companies’ choice of counsel.
CONCLUSION
The global financial crisis prompted corporate America to take a hard look
at the fees charged by its law firms. The continuing clamor for lower legal fees
has already prompted significant changes in the operations and work product
of corporate law firms and in companies’ processes for hiring them. But are
we headed in the right direction? Within this context, empirical studies of law
firm selection are long overdue. When faced with a range in quality, how do
corporate clients select among law firms, and are such selections valuemaximizing? This Article finds a substantial discrepancy between the choice
of counsel of private equity firms and public companies for major financing
transactions. While this result alone does not identify what motivates law-firm
selection, it narrows the set of plausible hypotheses considerably for future
work. In addition, it suggests a surprising tendency among large public
companies to spend too little on outside counsel for transactional work. While
the recent focus on legal fees is both timely and advisable, it should not be
understood to justify hiring lower-quality counsel as a rule.

Appendix A: Regressions with Industry Controls

Sponsored
ln(Loan Amount)
Acquisition Purpose
Secured Loan
Industry indicators:
Aerospace and defense
Agriculture
Automobiles, airlines and transportation
Banking and financial services
Chemicals
Computer and electronic equipment
Construction and materials
Consumer goods
Food and beverage
Forestry and paper
Insurance
Manufacturing and machinery
Media and entertainment
Medical devices and healthcare
Mining and metals
Oil and gas
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
Real estate
Retailers
Services
Telecommunications
Textiles and apparel
Travel and leisure

N

Top-Firm_1

Top-Firm_2

Top-Firm_3

4.320
(12.43)**
1.572
(10.50)**
1.003
(0.03)
1.650
(4.15)**

2.921
(7.48)**
1.553
(8.63)**
1.026
(0.18)
1.398
(2.42)*

3.660
(10.94)**
1.773
(12.77)**
0.964
(0.31)
1.617
(3.95)**

0.520
(0.73)
0.389
(1.15)
0.813
(0.77)
0.974
(0.10)
1.126
(0.39)
0.689
(1.27)
1.103
(0.32)
1.008
(0.02)
0.509
(1.95)
0.343
(2.21)*
0.840
(0.43)
0.697
(1.20)
1.100
(0.32)
0.822
(0.71)
0.774
(0.90)
1.313
(1.13)
1.534
(1.20)
0.468
(2.93)**
0.740
(1.19)
0.655
(1.80)
1.038
(0.11)
1.717
(1.45)
1.010
(0.03)

0.751
(0.30)
0.172
(1.61)
0.649
(1.38)
0.839
(0.54)
1.214
(0.57)
0.390
(2.59)**
0.998
(0.01)
2.553
(2.23)*
0.708
(0.91)
0.263
(2.18)*
0.903
(0.22)
0.614
(1.35)
1.137
(0.35)
0.735
(0.97)
0.793
(0.70)
0.816
(0.72)
0.861
(0.33)
0.462
(2.68)**
0.809
(0.73)
0.531
(2.33)*
0.809
(0.50)
0.631
(0.98)
0.878
(0.28)

0.937
(0.08)
0.158
(1.72)
1.091
(0.33)
1.194
(0.65)
1.060
(0.19)
0.647
(1.47)
0.960
(0.13)
1.024
(0.07)
0.406
(2.52)*
0.484
(1.62)
1.330
(0.75)
0.617
(1.58)
1.293
(0.85)
0.870
(0.51)
0.786
(0.85)
0.392
(3.57)**
1.558
(1.23)
0.433
(3.21)**
0.736
(1.21)
0.655
(1.81)
1.022
(0.06)
1.666
(1.37)
0.562
(1.45)

2,979
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

1,970

2,979

